NOTE
This report summarizes the results of the Council-funde d research contract identified on the face page . I t consists of an Executive Summary by the Principa l Investigator, together with excerpts (prepared by th e National Council) from four multi-authored researc h papers . Complete versions of these papers, includin g the footnotes, illustrations, and references omitte d here, are available from the Council on request .
Executive Summary .
• In order to provide insights into the productivity and growt h issues, one of our goals in the project was to estimate econometrically the effects of the main structural and policy features o f the Yugoslav firms (WOALs) . An examination of the institutiona l features of the system, which we summarized in our proposal t o NCSEER, suggested that we should estimate the total facto r productivity effects of (i) the degree of enterprise (WOAL ) divisionalization into smaller, semi-autonomous units called th e Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (BOALs), (ii) produc t market concentration (monopoly power), (iii) regional differences , (iv) enterprise export orientation, and (v) the existence of join t venture production with foreign firms .
The other two issues that we analyzed in the research projec t vii concern the efficiency of resource allocation and inter-enterpris e dispersion in labor (personal) incomes . The academic and polic y importance of these issues stems from the fact that if incumben t workers influence the policy of their firms and competitive marke t forces are weak, it is likely that resources will not be allocate d
optimally from the social standpoint in that marginal products o f inputs will vary across uses . The lack of competition als o implies that monopoly rents are likely to exist and be appropriated in part by workers as personal incomes . The observed interenterprise dispersion in incomes is likely to reflect thes e phenomena . In addition, the traditional labor-management theor y suggests that labor-managed firms behave in a perverse way b y reducing employment when the output price rises .
These potential problems that result from workers' contro l are inherent in the self-management system per se . In Yugoslavia , they have been exacerbated by two additional factors . First, i n the 1950s capital was allocated to firms by planners in a way tha t created large disparities in (marginal) capital productivitie s across firms . Since the 1960s, the misallocation of capital continued through the system of bank control by (large) firms . given the low wages (and labor productivity) elsewhere in th e economy .
3. In recent years, when wage and price controls hav e frequently been imposed, wages (personal incomes of workers) hav e not been found to vary systematically with prices and interes t rates . However, the wage effects of various structural variable s have been substantial . In the 1965-72 period of market selfmanagement, when government intervention in enterprise decisionmaking was minimal, one finds a positive link between outpu t prices and workers' incomes .
4. The sizable dispersion in workers' incomes that wa s observed in the 1965-72 market self-management period appears t o x be related more to the system of labor-management than to capita l rationing and incorrect pricing during the previous period o f planning .
The principal implications of these findings relate to th e policies aimed at the efficiency of resource use and enterpris e behavior in a relatively decentralized, socialist system wit h worker participation . These may be summarized as follows :
5. Recent Yugoslav policies have placed emphasis on expor t orientation and liberal approach toward joint ventures wit h western firms . These policies may yield important benefits (e .g .
in reducing foreign indebtedness) but, as our results indicate , they ought not to be justified by expected gains in productiv e efficiency . Similarly, our findings suggest that the ongoin g debate about the desirability of changing the system of enterpris e divisionalization should not be guided by expectations of gains o r losses in terms of productive efficiency . Finally, while allocation of investment funds among the republics and autonomou s provinces may in part be guided by political and social factors , our study indicates that differences in productive efficiency ar e significant and ought to be taken into account . In Section II1 we identify the relevant structural/polic y variables whose productivity effects we estimate . Section II I presents the estimating framework, while Section IV contains th e Finally, we find that productive efficiency is on average 19 -20 percent higher in the more developed republics and autonomou s provinces (RAPs) than in the less developed ones . This estimat e is statistically significant when the RAPs are divided into thes e two blocs, but due to collinearity it loses significance when w e try to identify RAP-specific efficiency levels by means of RA P dummy variables . While our visits to the sampled enterprise s suggest that productive efficiency is a problem in the les s developed RAPs, further research in this important area is clearl y needed before the source of regional differences can be full y identified .
EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME DETERMINATIO N IN YUGOSLAV LABOR-MANAGED FIRMS
by Jane z P r a s n i k a r 1 Jan Svejna r Dubravk o M i h a l j e k 2 Vesna Prasnika r 
V . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION S
As could be expected, the various approaches to the analysi s of the employment behavior of Yugoslav firms do not yield identical results . On the one hand, the nonlinear estimates in Table s 2-51 and the loglinear approximations to a reduced form labo r demand equation (Table 11) suggest that the firms operate somewha t to the right of their marginal product curves of labor and displa y employment fixity in the presence of output price fluctuations .
On the other hand, the linear approximations to the nonlinea r employment equations (Tables 4-10) suggest that firms in the mor e developed RAPs may operate to the left and those in the les s developed RAPs to the right of the marginal product curve o f labor . These two sets of findings are not completely at odds wit h one another but we intend to undertake further research in orde r to achieve a more complete reconciliation of these results . Ou r preliminary inclination is to place more weight on the first se t of results because they do not require the assumption that (WWd )/Wd be small . Indeed, in our data this relative wage differential is large (in excess of 30 percent) and the findings in Table s 4-10 may hence be biased .
'All tables are omitted from these excerpts .
In terms of public policy, the loglinear labor deman d equation suggests that the exchange rate policy (Dinar devaluation) had a positive impact on employment but that the limite d interest rate variation had no employment effect .
The loglinear wage (personal income) equations found n o impact of prices and interest rates on wages . However, the effec t of several structural/behavioral variables was found to b e significant . 
MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS IN

Krueger and Summers [1986]) .
A large number of observers both within and outside Yugoslavia have pointed to capital immobilities and inappropriat e capital allocation and pricing in the context of workers' selfmanagement as the source of the wage dispersion . This literature , henceforth referred to as the "capital school," points to a n environment in which self-managed firms face inefficient rationin g of scarce capital . There is dispersion in capital-labor ratio s between firms and industries beyond the control of the enterprise s themselves, and the rental price of capital is set below th e scarcity value . Given that labor-managed firms choose their labo r incomes subject to their individual parameter sets, worker s appropriate the resulting rents as personal income and wide incom e differentials appear .
In this study we follow Vanek and Jovicic's [1975] pioneerin g paper in formulating the problem in terms of "imputed capita l rentals, "defined by these authors as the product of the capitallabor ratio and the difference between the marginal revenu e product and cost of capital . Vanek and Jovicic's [1975] approach has been backed by considerable empirical work, and it is thi s formulation and widely quoted findings which we reassess in thi s paper . Their conclusion is that imputed capital rentals are th e sole detectable source of Yugoslav income differentials and tha t the appropriate policy is to charge for capital at a shado w (market clearing) price . We argue that these strong proposition s derive from a failure to consider adequately alternative source s of income dispersion and from a narrow specification of th e capital school hypothesis .
In fact, traditional models of a labor-managed market econom y identify numerous sources of income differentials and link them t o the particular systemic operation of the labor market in such a n economy . In this literature, income per worker is the enterpris e maximand as well as an endogenous variable which in equilibriu m equals the marginal revenue product of labor . Inter-firm incom e differentials therefore develop whenever firms face differin g economic circumstances . In essence, the problem in this type o f economy is the inability of workers to move into firms wher e incomes are higher and thereby reduce or eliminate earning s differentials . Under capitalism, competitive forces equalize th e wage paid to a common labor type in different industries, althoug h complete equalization may be prevented by compensating differentials and frictions . Under self-management, disturbances lead t o a dispersion of incomes and marginal value products of labor whic h will not be eliminated by labor mobility because, in order t o maintain their own incomes, existing members of labor-managed firms can prevent the recruitment of additional worker-members .
Entry and exit of firms is needed to transfer labor between use s and in the interim income differentials arise .
This broader formulation of the problem, henceforth referre d to as the "labor school," appears fruitful for understanding th e Yugoslav economy, which has been characterized by a low degree o f enterprise entry and exit (see Sacks [1983] and Petrin [1984] ) .
It suggests that Yugoslav income differentials have many causes , including inter-enterprise and inter-industry differences i n demand and cost conditions as well as the degree of product marke t monopoly power . The analysis is not inconsistent with that of th e capital school ; it is broader for it points attention to additional factors which could cause dispersion of earnings . (1973 ), World Bank (1975 ), Estrin (1981 , 1984 , and Lydal l (1984)) . Our paper develops the previous modelling of this issu e (see Vanek and Jovicic (1975), Estrin (1984) , Estrin and Svejna r Although in principle these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive , they have normally been treated as such and no rigorous attemp t has been made to evaluate their relative importance in explainin g the observed wage dispersion . Hence the formal microeconomi c models of Wachtel (1972 Wachtel ( , 1973 and Estrin (1984) focus exclusivel y on the labor school approach, while the more ad-hoc research in the capital school tradition has either failed to test for, or ha s failed to isolate, any significant determinants of wages othe r than capital rents (see e .g . Vanek and Jovicic (1975) , RiveraBatiz (1981 ), Stallerts (1981 ) .
In tackling this specific Yugoslav issue, the paper strive s to bridge two methodological camps that have analyzed the dynami c behavior of firms . On the one hand, economic theorists hav e developed tightly specified models of intertemporal optimizatio n which have so far not been used widely in applied work . In fact , most empirical researchers have preferred to avoid the tigh t structure of the formal models and relied instead on ad hoc (flexible) approximations to the dynamic estimating equations .
The problem in the literature is hence that the theoretical model s are perhaps based on too restrictive assumptions to be widel y accepted among applied researchers, while the approximations i n most empirical work are often seen as too loose for a clear-cu t theoretical interpretation .
In this paper, we use both of these approaches to tackle th e substantive issue that we investigate . In particular, we firs t estimate a general approximation to a dynamic earnings equatio n under labor-management and then present a formal dynamic mode l together with estimates of its relevant coefficients . Secondly, we have sought to contribute to the empirica l methodology in this area . To that end, assumptions were made t o derive a log-linear version of an earnings equation which theor y suggested would be highly non-linear, particularly by compariso n with profit-maximizing firms . Dynamics were added to thi s equation in an d hoc way . Though the results were good i n econometric terms, the underlying model was a bit loose for an entirely convincing interpretation of the findings . In contrast , a nonlinear model derived from a first order condition of th e intertemporal income maximization problem was also estimated . Th e parameters from this model had well-defined interpretations bu t the econometric results were less satisfactory . Even so, the tw o approaches yielded a consistent pattern .
The central finding of the paper, derived from both loglinea r approximation and the-nonlinear model, is that, contrary t o previous results, capital rentals actually play an insignifican t role in explaining the wide inter-industry earnings variation i n Yugoslavia over the period of market self-management . Estimate s suggest that, over the whole period, less than 0 .1% of earning s could be attributed to capital rents . This suggests that Yugoslav policy-makers, rather than focussing on capital allocation by th e state to correct earnings dispersion, should concentrate o n liberalizing labor and product markets .
